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There is so much to say about Mr. Yong-Set’s project, that, arguably the first thing to say is that
there is a lot to say, because the fact that there is a lot to say, says something very important. I
will return to this in a moment.
Despite the wordplay, I don’t mean to be playing games here. Rather, my intention is to
improve our cognitive fields with respect to what he has proposed. However, since my
understanding of what counts as cognitive improvement is not limited to increases in knowledge,
imparting information is not necessary. I count an increase in understanding as a significant
cognitive gain, whether or not there is an accompanying increase in propositional knowledge. I’d
say the same thing about increasing one’s ability to engage with a topic – e.g., to be able to voice
appreciation, offer a judgment, raise an objection, or ask a good question. Argumentation may be
the epitome of engagement, as well as the primary vehicle for understanding. What could be a
better sign that an argument has been a good one than that both the proponent and opponent
come away with a better understanding of their differences and their own standpoints, even if
neither one has changed her beliefs?
Metaphor may be even more effective than argumentation as a way to engage us and
enhance our understanding. Think of the transformation in our understanding of religions – but
not of our knowledge – due to Marx and Engels’ provocative identification of religion as the
opiate of the masses. Think, too, of how that metaphor compels us to make sense of its semantic
anomaly, because we already know that religions are not opiates. A metaphor that piques our
interest or helps us appreciate a new way of looking at the world surely deserves credit for those
positive cognitive changes.
What that means is that when we argue about the metaphors we use for arguments, the
possibilities of something good coming from it are very good indeed!
So let’s focus on Mr. Yong-Set’s metaphor of arguments as fit objects for ludological
analysis. In treating his proposal as a metaphor, I am not assuming he meant for it to be taken
that way. But in the spirit of generosity, that is how I take it. One reason I take it as a metaphor is
that it does not work as a literal claim: despite important points of congruence, arguments are not
literally games. The differences are too salient to ignore. A more important reason is that
metaphors act like instructions: “See this thing through the lens provided by the cluster of
concepts associated with that other thing.” They require active engagement in the form of
interpretive contributions from their audiences for completion. The ludological perspective needs
that work. But the most important reason that I take it as a metaphor – but most definitely not as
a mere metaphor – is that it is too meaningful, too interesting, and too important to be treated as
merely a factual claim. It deserves better.
The important question thus becomes whether it is a good metaphor.
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I do not yet know the answer to that question. It could turn out to be a good metaphor, but
the jury is out and it will stay out until some of the interpretive work I just referred to gets done. I
suppose the fact that a verdict is not yet in could be counted as a negative – either as a failure to
do the necessary developmental work or as a failure to demonstrate the vitality of the metaphor –
but that would be (forgive the phrase) a “premature evaluation.” It would be an impatient
response betraying a stunted appreciation for how metaphors work and how arguments work. In
both cases, the cognitive effects often occur well after the relevant speech acts.
Consider the war metaphor for arguments. It is dominant, entrenched, and an almost
clichéd way of talking about arguments. We are all familiar with the similarities – adversariality,
strategies, attacks-and-counterattacks, winning-and-losing, etc. Those similarities make it a
viable metaphor. We are all also well aware of the limits of the metaphor: we argue instead of
going to war; arguments are not failures of diplomacy; arguments do not deploy armies with
weapons that kill innnocent people, etc. Those differences make it a metaphor rather than a
literal description. And then there are the things that make it a terrible metaphor, such as its
emphasis on the destructive elements of argumentation, the deforming consequences that such an
emphasis has on how we argue, and the privileging of aggressive modes of intellectual activity at
the expense of other forms of inquiry. But – and this is where the story gets really interesting –
there are also things that make it a terrific metaphor despite its flaws. In generating lists of
similarities and differences, where do we put the war-related concepts of, say, exit strategies and
collateral damage? Are there counterparts in argumentation? Once the question is asked, we can
see that there are. And what about Just War Theory? Are there Just and Unjust Arguments? Why,
Yes, there are! What an interesting and important question to ask – but it’s not a question that we
even could have asked in just that form without the backdrop of the argument-is-war metaphor.
There is still meat to be extracted from that old chestnut.
How does a ludological perspective on argument stack up? Is it a viable metaphor that
generates a comparably fruitful research program, hopefully without the negative consequences?
What I am asking amounts to four questions, all as preparatory for a fifth question, the most
important one. The four questions are as follows:
1. What are the relevant and important similarities, the points of congruence,
between games and arguments?
2. What are the dissimilarities? What are the important ways in which arguments
are not games and not even like games?
3. What might the effects be of thinking about arguments as games on how we
argue? Might we be inclined to argue more playfully? Would that conception
exacerbate or mitigate the negative effects of the argument-as-war metaphor?
4. What insights into argumentation might be gained by adopting the ludological
perspective that would be inaccessible or less accessible from other approaches?
It is only after we have answers to these questions – even if just partial and provisional – that we
can address the fifth question:
5. Should we engage with this metaphor? Do we have sufficient reason to adopt a
ludological perspective?
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As could have been expected, Yong-Set has focused on identifying similarities between
games and arguments while downplaying differences. Leaving the differences to others is not an
advisable strategy because others will be all too happy to oblige. This is where Yong-Set brings
in Wittgenstein on games, but with curious, unintended, double-edged effects. Many morals can
be drawn from Wittgenstein’s discussion, but anti-essentialism has to be one of them. The range
of application of the word is too vast, diverse, and loosely connected for strict definition. And
that arguably applies to arguments, too. But here Yong-Set reverses course: he does offer a
definition of games in terms of formal systems, possibility spaces, and unequal outcomes; he
doubles down by offering a definition of arguments, too, in terms of intended cognitive
improvements; and he cements it all in place with references to the argument language game,
rather than games in the plural. Besides being antithetical to the Wittgensteinian spirit that
informed the earlier part of his discussion, it practically demands legalistic counterexamples and
contrarian objections. Arguments aim for cognitive improvement? Is that what our arguments
about whether to go for Thai food or Chinese food, about empty gas tanks, and how much of a
raise the striking workers should get are all about? We can, of course, squeeze those arguments
into the cognitive improvement model, but that insults the theory by trivializing it.
The third and fourth questions are more important: What effect would a ludological
perspective have on how we think about arguments and how we argue? On the side of praxis,
would we be likely to argue less agonistically – entering arguments with a “lusory attitude” –
since a game requires prior agreement on which game we will play and its rules? Would we take
argumentation less seriously? Is argumentation an optional activity? Above all, what theoretical
advantages and insights might result? How does a ludological perspective enlarge the possibility
space for argumentation theory? That question has not yet been answered.
So, back to the last question: do we have enough reason to justify adopting the
ludological perspective? Sadly, I think the answer is that we do not. Not yet. But, as I said, there
is a lot to say about Yong-Set’s proposal. So, while we may not have sufficient grounds for
adopting the ludological perspective, he has given us more than enough reason to explore his
proposal. And, happily, that is the kind of engagement that good arguments – and good
metaphors – deserve.
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